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Abstract
We develop a model in which the elasticity of credit to exogenous shocks
depends on creditor rights regulations. We show that an increase in
creditor protection reduces the elasticity of credit supply to exogenous
shocks, and hence the amplitude of the credit cycle. Using an extended set
of a measure of creditor rights protection in the spirit of La Porta et al.
(1998), we find that stricter creditor rights regulations not only increase
the breadth of the credit market but also reduce the volatility of the credit
cycle.
                                                       
1 We are grateful to José Antonio Rivas, who collected and analyzed codes and regulations for each
Latin American and Caribbean country and helped us construct the creditor rights index, and to
participants at the IDB brown bag seminar for their comments.
21. Introduction
The implications of laws and regulations that protect creditors for the
efficiency of financial markets have been amply debated in the literature. On one
hand, several authors have argued that protecting creditors has important benefits
since it allows credit markets to provide funds at a low cost. Outside investors are
willing to pay more for financial assets -as equity and debt- when creditor’ rights are
protected by law. Legal protection assures that more of firms’ profits would come
back to investors as interest or dividends. Creditor rights protection leads to a large
credit market and low interest margins.2
On the other hand, as noted by Padilla and Requejo (2000), other authors
suggest that strict creditor protection can reduce risk-taking incentives, work against
entrepreneurship, reduce credit demand, generate efficiency costs and may produce
an effect opposite to what is intended.3 In addition, some pro creditor rights
regulations can act as a barrier for entry into new industries and inhibit new growth
opportunities.4
Recent papers by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997 and
1998), subsequently referred to as LLSV, have given new impetus to the discussion
of the importance of regulations regarding creditor rights over collateral for the
development of financial markets, by providing very valuable data on the state of
creditor rights regulations around the world. Based on this data conflicting views on
the impact of creditor rights on credit markets have been tested. Unlike theoretical
arguments, empirical evidence tends to be inclined towards the first view described
above.
LLSV find that, controlling for macro features, creditor rights and law
enforceability have a strong positive effect on the size the of credit markets.
However, when including additional macroeconomic controls, Padilla and Requejo
(2000) conclude that creditor rights protection loses its explanatory power, casting
doubts on the LLSV results.
Although the benefit of creditor rights protection and law enforceability for
financial development has been well documented, the effect of these variables on the
credit cycle and volatility has received less attention. Figure 1 presents the
                                                       
2 Simple extensions of the models in Angbazo (1997) and Wong (1997) lead to this conclusion
regarding the interest rate margin. If credit risk is exacerbated by inadequate creditor protection, a
positive relationship between the interest margin and creditor rights regulations can be obtained.
Results on the impact on credit market breadth are derived in this paper.
3 Papers in this line are Bebchuk and Fried (1996) and Berkovitch, Ronen and Zender (1997).
4 See Carr and Mathewson (1988).
3relationship between effective creditor rights and credit volatility across countries
after controlling for GDP volatility. The former variable is the product of the LLSV
creditor rights index and the Kaufmann et al. (1999) law enforceability measure, and
credit volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the real credit growth rate
during the nineties (idem for GDP).
Figure 1: Credit Volatility and Creditor Rights
(Controlling by GDP Volatility)
Countries with lower effective creditor right seem to have lower credit
volatility after controlling for GDP volatility. Figure 1 suggests that the effect of
shocks (proxied by changes in GDP) on real credit is amplified by low creditor
rights.5 In terms of this sample, an improvement in effective creditor rights from the
19th –Brazil- to the 80th percentile –Norway- reduces credit volatility in almost 50
percent (from 9.2 to 4.8 %).
There is a long tradition in macroeconomics, beginning with Fisher and
Keynes, which emphasizes the role of credit markets in the propagation of cyclical
fluctuations. In recent years, adverse credit-market conditions have been cited as
                                                       
5 In Section 3 we deal with the potential inverse causality in this relation.
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4sources and propagation mechanisms of recessions (Japan, Latin America, U.S.).6
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) study, from a theoretical point of view, how credit
constraints interact with aggregate economic activity over the business cycle. Using
a dynamic setup in which lenders cannot force borrowers to repay unless their debts
are secured, these authors find that the interaction between credit limits (collateral)
and asset prices turns out to be an important transmission and amplifier mechanism
for exogenous shocks to credit and output. Using this setup, we can think that
effective creditor rights decrease credits limits –collateral becomes more valuable-
and therefore reduces the amplitude of the cycle for a given exogenous shock.7
Using a different approach, Bernake, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) develop a
dynamic general equilibrium model, which exhibits a “Financial Accelerator.” In
their setup entrepreneurs are financially constrained and have to borrow from a
financial intermediary. To motivate a nontrivial role for financial structure, they
assume a “costly state verification.” This auditing cost, which is proportional to the
debt, is paid only in case of default and therefore is interpretable as a bankruptcy
cost. Using this setup, the paper finds that bankruptcy costs amplify the effect of
exogenous shocks on both investment (which is related to credit) and output. In this
model, an improvement of creditor rights can be thought of as a reduction in
bankruptcy costs.
In a recent empirical paper, Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman (1999)
present evidence that the weakness of legal institutions plays an important role in
explaining the extent of depreciation and stock market decline in the “Asian Crisis”
(1997-1998). Even though their work mainly focuses on minority shareholders’
expropriation by managers and not on private credit, this study suggests that
corporate governance mattered a great deal for the extent of macro variables’
fluctuation during the crises.
Extending the LLSV country coverage to 15 developing countries, we
replicate their work as well as the Padilla and Requejo exercise. We find strong
evidence regarding the positive effect of creditor rights protection on the size of the
credit market, even when controlling for all macroeconomic variables used by
Padilla and Requejo. Additionally, we explore from an empirical and theoretical
perspective the relationship between creditor rights regulations and the credit cycle.
Using a costly state verification type of model, we find that an improvement in
effective creditor rights reduces credit cycles. Our model features behavior is
broadly consistent with the credit cycles observed around the world during the
nineties.
                                                       
6 See for example Bernanke and Lown (1991).
7 In the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) setup, we introduce creditor rights by assuming that an
entrepreneur can borrow from creditors as long as the repayment does not exceed a fraction of the
market value of his asset, where this fraction is an increasing function of creditor rights.
5The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our basic
model, which captures the links between creditor rights, credit market breadth and
the credit cycle. Section 3 describes the data set used to test the implications of our
basic model. Sections 4 and 5 present empirical evidence about the role of creditor
rights regulation in explaining both credit market breadth and the amplitude of the
credit cycle. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Basic Model
Consider a model in which firms seek to finance investment projects of a size
normalized to one. Firms’ projects can either succeed with probability p, in which
case the project yields Yi in the second period T2, or fail with probability (1-p), in
which case the project yields 0. In either case (failure or success), the entrepreneur
enjoys a private benefit from running the firm (b>0). All projects are the same
except in the benefit they yield in the case of success (Yi). In this set up a higher Yi
means a higher quality of the project. This quality is observable by the bank. The
cumulative distribution of firms in term of their quality is F(.).
After the project’s type is revealed (failure or success), but before the
investment yields its outcome in period T2, the project can be stopped with a
liquidation value of a (>>b).8 This assumption implies that all bad projects should
be liquidated, but the private benefit induces entrepreneurs to try to keep the firm
running even when the project would yield nothing in period T2. This model could
be thought of as one with short-term debt rollover. Banks lend I=1 in period To. If
the project fails it does not roll over the debt and liquidates the firm –note that the
entrepreneur does not have the incentives to liquidate by himself (b>0)-. In case of
success the bank rolls over the debt.
Banks are competitive and face an infinitely elastic supply of deposits. The
riskless interest rate is normalized to zero. In equilibrium, each bank asks a payment
Di that could be collected in period T2 only if the project ends up being a good one.
If the project fails the bank liquidates its loan and receives a q in period T1. The
bankruptcy cost parameter q represents the fraction of the liquidation value that the
bank effectively receives when it decides to liquidate a project. Therefore a lower q
means a higher bankruptcy cost.
                                                       
8a must be lower than one because of fire sale and asset specificity. See Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
Nature Reveals Type
(success or failure)
To T1 T2
Bank lends Ii=1 Bank liquidates if project fails            ® Bank’s payoff: a q
or not. Bank does not liquidate if project succeeds  ® Bank’s payoff: Di
6Perfect competition between banks implies that equation 1 will determine the
equilibrium payment for a project type Yi.
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This result implies that the gross interest rate (Ri) and the intermediation margin (ri)
for the project i are:
p
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Both the margin and the gross interest rate decrease with the probability of
success and the fraction of initial investment that the bank can get in case of
bankruptcy (a q). It is important to note that all financed projects have the same
interest rate (Ri=R) and the same intermediation margin (ri=r).
The fraction of projects financed in this economy is given by one minus the
cumulative distribution evaluated at the first project that a competitive bank would
like to finance (Y*). For this marginal project Di is equal to Yi.
From equation 1 we estimate Y* and therefore we determine the aggregate
level of credit (which equals to investment) in this economy:
( )*1 YFC -= [3]
where
p
aqp)1(1* --=Y [4]
From equations [2] and [3] it is easy to see that the lower the bankruptcy cost the
higher the equilibrium amount of credit and the lower the gross interest rate.
Finally, we study the relationship between the level of credit and the business
cycle. A recession is defined as a lower probability that any project succeeds (p).
The elasticity of credit with respect to the probability of success is:
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During recessions credit falls because the generalized lower probability of
success (p) reduces the number of projects that have an expected return higher than
the riskless interest rate.
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For distributions with a non-extreme decreasing hazard rate, for example the
exponential (Weibull with p>1), uniform,10 and log-normal,11 the fall in credit after a
decrease in the probability of success is larger the higher the bankruptcy cost (lower
q). The intuition behind this result is that the difference in banks’ payoffs between
success and failure is bigger for countries with low creditor rights (low q).
This last result suggests that countries with inefficient bankruptcy procedures
should have a higher volatility in the amount of credit over the cycle. Focusing on
the gross interest rate, we find that its elasticity with respect to the probability of
success is:
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During recessions the gross interest rate increases because projects become
more risky (the probability of failure is higher). This increase in the interest rate is
smaller the lower the bankruptcy cost (large q). This result suggests that countries
                                                       
9 Depending on the distribution we use, one or the other specification makes results clearer.
10 For the case of Exponential (and Weibull p>1) and Uniform distribution we know that the hazard
rate is not decreasing, therefore using the first specification we can see immediately that equation [6]
is negative. The Hazard rate for an Exponential distribution is constant and therefore
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It is a well known result that for the Log-Normal distribution the hazard rate multiplied by the
variable is non-decreasing, therefore using the previous equation we prove that the elasticity of
equation [6] is negative.
8with inefficient bankruptcy procedures should also have a higher volatility in the
interest rate.
3. Data
The LLSV study collects information for 48 countries on regulations
regarding creditor rights. Their sample includes roughly as many developed as
developing countries; given that developed countries account for less than 10% of
the world, this can induce some bias in the further analysis.  LLSV construct an
index that summarizes regulations determining creditor rights to control collateral in
case firms file for bankruptcy or reorganization. They study whether regulations
impose an automatic stay on assets in case of reorganization, whether they grant
secured creditors the right to be paid first in case of bankruptcy, whether they force
firms to consult with creditors before filling for reorganization, and whether they
force a removal of the firm’s management during reorganization. In short, these
regulations provide an adequate picture of how regulation protects creditors.
By examining country codes and regulations on bankruptcy procedures and
reorganizations and following LLSV, we update their sample to include the whole
Latin American region and part of the Caribbean. Our index, in the spirit of LLSV,
is reported in Table A1 in Appendix 1. In the table, LLSV’s measures are also
reported. Except for Ecuador, which measures 1 in our index and 4 in LLSV, there
are no major differences in the countries where overlaps occur.
4. Creditor Rights and Credit Market Breadth: Additional Evidence
The model in Section 2, as well as the cited work by LLSV, suggest that
credit market depth depends on the stance of the legal environment surrounding the
credit market. In particular, LLSV show that once corrected for the size of the
economy and previous growth, both their creditor rights measure and the rule of law
index come in significant in an OLS regression having the ratio of private debt to
GNP as the dependent variable. Padilla and Requejo (subsequently referred to as
PR) extend the LLSV empirical analysis to include additional macro controls such
as inflation and the ratio of government surplus to GDP. They find that once
controlled for these the significance of the creditor rights variable vanishes, but the
rule of law variable remains significant.
In this section we report regressions similar to those in LLSV and in PR with
a few variants. First, we introduce a variable that we call effective creditor rights,
9which is the interaction of the rule of law variable and the creditor rights index.12
This variable captures the effect of law enforcement on creditor regulation.
Countries with high creditor rights can lose their benefits if rules and regulations are
not enforced. Table A2 in Appendix 1 reports our measurement of effective creditor
rights.
Table 1 presents our cross-country results. Columns I and II report
regressions similar to LLSV and PR, in the sense that we use their exact data and
specification.13 As in LLSV and PR, the creditor rights index in itself comes in
significantly at a marginal level, but does not come in significant when including
additional controls. An F test, however, rejects that both credit rights and rule of law
are jointly insignificant. In columns III and IV we present regressions similar to the
previous ones, but including a larger sample. We update the LLSV and PR data sets
to include information on all Latin American and Caribbean countries for which we
updated the LLSV index, and we complete some missing data of the previous data
sets. In short,we extend the sample to include 58 countries. The only important
difference regarding additional data is that we use the Kaufmann et al. (1999) rule of
law index, which has a wider variety of countries.14 Unlike the PR study, in the
expanded sample we find that creditor rights are a significant determinant of credit
market breadth. The effective creditor rights index appears highly significant, but
now the creditor rights variable in itself appears significant also. Coefficients,
however, remain relatively constant across specifications, suggesting that the new
data allows a more precise estimation of the model’s standard errors.15
Summarizing, this section has shown more robust evidence that confirms
results that were previously questioned in the creditor rights empirical literature.
Countries with higher creditor protection and with higher law enforcement tend to
have deeper credit markets than those where credit protection is low.
                                                       
12 Effective creditor rights = rule of law * creditor rights. Both rule of law and creditor rights have
been normalized to the 0-1 interval, which implies that effective creditor rights protection also ranges
between 0 and 1. Higher values indicate greater protection of creditors.
13 LLSV regress the ratio of debt to GNP in 1994, on the log of current GNP to capture scale effects,
average growth rates of the previous 25 years to capture the fact that financial sectors grow more in
more dynamic economies, rule of law, and the creditor rights index. PR extend the set of regressors to
include inflation and government surplus as measures of policy performance. The coefficients on the
rule of law index and the creditor rights index differ to theirs because we have normalized them to the
0-1 interval, so that our effective creditor rights index can be interpreted in the same interval.
14 Again we have normalized it to the 0-1 interval.
15 We estimated regressions considering a different cross section of dates. Results remain unchanged
and are available upon request.
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5. Creditor Rights and the Credit Cycle: Empirical Evidence
Equation 6 suggests that the credit cycle is smoother in countries with higher
creditor rights than in those with low protection. To test for the validity of this
proposition, we construct a panel in which we gather information for the 1990-1999
period for the 59 countries of our sample. Our panel is unbalanced due to lack of
information on several years for some countries, and it is confined to the 1990s in
order to avoid the impact of possible changes in regulation which we can not capture
due to the fact that the creditor rights data is collected in only one moment in time.
To describe some stylized facts, we study the relationship between real credit
volatility and output shocks, which we initially assume equal to GDP volatility. The
model presented in Section 4 suggests that the elasticity of credit growth with
respect to shocks is a function of creditor protection, therefore for a given level of
output volatility countries with lower effective creditor rights should have higher
credit volatility. To test this hypothesis we estimate the following regression:
iiiii GDPVolRigthsCredGDPVolCreditVol edba +++= *.
where CredRights represents the effective creditor rights, and CreditVol and
GDPVol are the cross time standard deviation of the de-trended rate of growth of
real credit and GDP, respectively.16 Table 2 presents the estimated coefficient for the
59 countries in our sample.
As expected, higher variance in real credit is associated with countries with
more volatile output. The GDP volatility coefficient is positive and significant at
1%. As predicted by theory, the coefficient of the interaction on the volatility of
output and effective creditor protection is negative and also significant at 1%. In
terms of this sample and for the median country in terms of output volatility, an
increase in effective creditor rights from the 19th (Brazil) to 80th percentile (Norway)
implies a 50% reduction in real credit volatility.
To see if these results hold at the yearly base, we study the effect of shocks
on the real credit rate of growth using year-country data. We proxy the yearly
change in the state of the economy (shocks) in two different ways. First, we
construct a measure of exogenous shocks, which is basically the weighted average of
the real growth rates of the countries’ trading partners.17 Second, we proxy it by
GDP growth; however, since this is likely to be endogenous to credit cycles, we
                                                       
16 As a de-trended rate of growth we use the current rate of growth minus the mean for the country
during the period analyzed.
17 GDP growths are weighted by total export to this country divided by domestic GDP. Note that the
weight does not equal one.
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instrument it with our foreign shocks measure and year dummies, which capture a
contagion effect. In order to capture the changing nature of the coefficient across
different legal regimes we interact the state of the economy proxy variable with the
creditor rights variable, as predicted by the model. In order to expand the model we
also include additional controls such as the change in the rate of inflation and the
government’s surplus in our specification.18  Tables 3 and 4 report our results using
GDP growth and the foreign shock variable, respectively. Columns 1 and 2 show
our findings using the effective aggregate index of creditor rights conditions.
Column 2 includes the additional macro controls. Our results suggest that an
increase in  “effective” creditor rights reduces the amplitude of the real credit cycle.
Columns 3 and 4 reports similar results considering the creditor rights index
and the rule of law index separately. Our results, even when controlling for
macroeconomic conditions, remain unchanged. An increase in creditor protection
reduces the impact of shocks over the credit market. An increase in creditor rights
from the lowest level to the highest, can diminish the elasticity of credit growth to a
shock by nearly 50%.
The IV estimation captures the impact of the exogenous component of GDP
growth over credit expansion. In theory, if the instruments are set properly this must
be the final result of the estimation. However, it is likely that some indirect effect of
the shock, namely the effect of a change in credit demand as a response to GDP
fluctuations, is not completely isolated. In order to eliminate such a source of
uncertainty the regressions are run again, assuming that the shock operates directly
and not through GDP. The results, as reported in Table 3, remain unchanged.
In order to corroborate the results above and to correct for country-specific
institutional and macroeconomic factors that could have been ignored in previous
specifications, Table B1 in Appendix 2 presents fixed effects regressions similar to
those above. As shown, the results hold and their interpretation remains intact.
Finally Table 5 presents some evidence on the impact of creditor rights
regulations on GDP. We use the panel described above to estimate the response of
GDP growth to the external shock and to the shock interacted with the creditor rights
index. Our results have the adequate sign, that is countries with lower creditor
protection experience larger fluctuations after an external shock, but are significant
only at the 15% significance level. This, however, can be a matter of specification,
since at the end many different channels, which we are not capturing, interact in the
process from shocks to GDP growth.
                                                       
18 In order to allow for lags in the adjustment of credit markets we include the macro controls with a
lag, and we instrument them with themselves since no endogeneity is apparent here.
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6. Non Parametric Evidence
In order to test the robustness of our findings we explore an alternative
empirical technique to assess the role of creditor protection in amplifying credit
cycles. We fit a natural cubic spline based on the empirical model used in the
previous section. In particular, we fit the spline in the effective creditor rights index
to the absolute value of the ratio of de-trended credit growth to de-trended GDP
growth. That is, as our dependent variable we use:
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where credit and GDP are in real terms, and the bar over the variable reflects the
sample average for each country. Country rates of growth are de-trended to reflect
the cyclical component. To avoid instability around zero GDP growth rates we
exclude observations within a 5% window around zero GDP growth, which leaves
us with 536 observations.
Figure 2: Cubic Spline
Figure 2 shows our spline estimate. Clearly, and as predicted by theory, there
is a negative relationship between creditor rights protection and the response of
credit growth to economy-wide shocks captured in the de-trended GDP growth rate.
The higher the degree of creditor protection, the lower the difference between
economy-wide shocks and the response of the credit market.
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7. Conclusions
This paper extends the LLSV sample and includes creditor rights information
for most of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. We find that once the
sample of countries is balanced toward the true World share of developing countries,
the LLSV results regarding the impact of creditor rights regulations on the size of
credit markets, previously questioned by Padilla and Requejo, regain their statistical
significance.
Additionally, we extend the previous analysis on the impact of regulation on
the breadth of credit markets to analyze the impact on credit cycles and marginally
on business cycles. We find that creditor rights play an important role, by
exacerbating credit risk in countries where creditor rights are not protected, and
hence induce an overreaction of credit markets to exogenous shocks. We present
parametric panel data type evidence using various shock measures, and additionally
non parametric spline regression to illustrate the findings of our theoretical model.
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9. Tables
Table 1
Dependent Variable: Private Credit / GNP
Estimation Method: OLS
GDP Growth 0.044 * 0.046 * -0.029 -0.028
0.022 0.027 0.021 0.023
Log (GNP) 0.064 ** 0.074 ** 0.076 *** 0.111 ***
0.029 0.030 0.022 0.020
Inflation -0.0001 -2.46E-05 -9.64E-05
0.0001 1.18E-04 1.27E-04
Government Surplus/GDP 0.0084 0.0128 * 0.012
0.0064 0.0073 0.008
Efective Creditor Rights 0.479 ***
0.165
Rule of Law 0.633 *** 0.597 *** 0.694 ***
0.164 0.175 0.158
Creditor Rights 0.190 0.158 0.184 *
0.120 0.129 0.105
Constant -0.875 *** -0.918 *** -0.766 *** -0.803 ***
0.312 0.326 0.218 0.215
R2 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.46
F test (Whole Regression) 11.82 7.48 12.06 10.03
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F test (Creditor Rights + Rule of Law) 10.45 7.26 10.84
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00
Obs 39 36 55 55
*** Significant at 1%
**  Significant at 5%
*   Significant at 10%
III
Explanatory Variables
With 
Effective 
Creditor 
Rights
IV
LLSV PR
Extended 
Sample
I II
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Table 2
Dependent Variable: Std(Real Credit Growth)
Estimation Method: OLS
Explanatory Variables
Std. Growth 4.15 ***
1.01
Effective Creditor Rights*Std.Growth -5.29 ***
1.33
Constant 0.04 **
0.02
R2 0.38
F test (Whole Regression) 9.15
Prob > F 0.00
Obs 59
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
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Table 3
Estimation Method: IV (2SLS)
Dependent Variable: DLn(Real Private Credit)
Explanatory Variables I II III IV
DLn(GDP) 2.01 *** 2.68 ** 1.73 ** 2.46 **
0.73 1.14 0.70 1.07
DLn(GDP)*Cred_Index -1.32 ** -1.40 **
0.61 0.55
DLn(GDP)*Creditor Rights -0.29 * -0.20
0.16 0.14
DLn(GDP)*Rule of Law -0.76 -1.19
0.80 0.77
DLn(Inf) -0.08 -0.08
0.06 0.06
Gov Surplus/GDP 4.20E-03 ** 3.90E-03 **
1.88E-03 2.00E-03
Constant 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
R2 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.21
F test (Whole Regression) 3.95 2.25 8.45 6.93
Prob > F 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.00
F test (Creditor Rights + Rule of Law) 2.02 2.23
Prob > F 0.13 0.11
Obs 564 564 420 420
*** Significant at 1%
**  Significant at 5%
*   Significant at 10%
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Table 4
Estimation Method: OLS
Dependent Variable: DLn(Real Private Credit)
Explanatory Variables I II III IV
Foreign Shock 6.44 *** 10.17 *** 6.84 *** 11.50 ***
1.95 3.35 2.17 3.84
Foregin Shock*Cred_Index -6.16 *** -7.37 ***
2.11 2.30
Foreign shock*Creditor Rights -1.14 * -1.16 *
0.63 0.69
Foreign shock*Rule of Law -5.20 * -7.31 ***
2.93 2.78
DLn(Inf) -0.10 * -0.10 *
0.05 0.05
Gov Surplus/GDP 6.48E-03 *** 6.35E-03 ***
1.76E-03 1.70E-03
Constant 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.05 *** 0.05 ***
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
R2 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.10
F test (Whole Regression) 7.07 4.78 9.06 7.42
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F test (Creditor Rights + Rule of Law) 3.85 4.69
Prob > F 0.02 0.01
Obs 568 568 421 421
*** Significant at 1%
**  Significant at 5%
*   Significant at 10%
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Table 5
Estimation Method: OLS and Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: DLn(Real GDP)
Explanatory Variables OLS F.E.
Foreign Shock 1.43 *** 3.65 ***
0.47 1.04
Foregin Shock*Cred_Index -0.76 -2.50 **
0.51 1.09
Constant 0.01 *** 0.02 ***
0.00 0.01
R2 0.10 0.23
F test (Whole Regression) 5.73 5.07
Prob > F 0.00 0.00
Obs 586 586
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%
Year dummies
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Appendix 1
Table A1
Creditor Rights Index
COUNTRY No
Automatic
Stay on
Assets
Secured
Creditors
Paid First
Restrictions
for going into
reorganization
Management
does not stay
during
reorganization
Creditors
Rights
1 = Creditors are protected by law
Latin American and Carribbean Countriesa
Argentina 0 1 0 0 1
Belice 0 1 1 0 2
Bolivia 0 0 1 1 2
Brazil 1(0) 0 0 (1) 0 1
Chile 0 0 (1) 1 0 1 (2)
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0
Costa Rica 0 0 0 1 1
Ecuador 0 (1) 0 (1) 1 0(1) 1 (4)
El Salvador 1 0 1 0 2
Guatemala 0 0 1 0 1
Haiti 0 0 1 1 2
Honduras
Jamaica 0 0 1 0 1
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0
Nicaragua 0 1 1 0 2
Panamá 1 0 1 1 3
Paraguay 0 0 1 0 1
Perú 0 0 0 0 0
Rep.Dom 0 0 1 0 1
T&T 1 1 1 0 3
Uruguay 0 1 0 0 (1) 1(2)
Venezuela 0 1 1 0 2
Rest of LLSV Sample
Australia 0 1 0 0 1
Austria 1 1 1 0 3
Belgium 1 1 0 0 2
Canada 0 1 0 0 1
Denmark 1 1 1 0 3
Egypt 1 1 1 1 4
Finland 0 1 0 0 1
France 0 0 0 0 0
Germany 1 1 1 0 3
Greece 0 0 0 1 1
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Hong Kong 1 1 1 1 4
India 1 1 1 1 4
Indonesia 1 1 1 1 4
Ireland 0 1 0 0 1
Israel 1 1 1 1 4
Italy 0 1 1 0 2
Japan 0 1 0 1 2
Kenya 1 1 1 1 4
Korea 1 1 0 1 3
Malaysia 1 1 1 1 4
Netherlands 0 1 1 0 2
New Zealand 1 0 1 1 3
Nigeria 1 1 1 1 4
Norway 0 1 1 0 2
Pakistan 1 1 1 1 4
Philippines 0 0 0 0 0
Portugal 0 1 0 0 1
Singapore 1 1 1 1 4
South Africa 0 1 1 1 3
Spain 1 1 0 0 2
Sri Lanka 1 0 1 1 3
Sweden 0 1 1 0 2
Switzerland 0 1 0 0 1
Thailand 1 1 0 1 3
Turkey 0 1 1 0 2
UK 1 1 1 1 4
USA 0 1 0 0 1
Zimbabwe 1 1 1 1 4
a Source: Country codes and regulations. Bold names are those countries that also appear in LLSV.
 LLSV results are reported in parenthesis
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Table A2
Country Creditor
Rights
(Between 0
and 1)
Rule of Law
(Between 0
and 1)
Effective
Creditor
Rights
(Between 0
and 1)
Argentina 0.25 0.58 0.14
Australia 0.25 0.90 0.22
Austria 0.75 0.95 0.71
Belgium 0.50 0.70 0.35
Belize 0.50 0.52 0.26
Bolivia 0.50 0.41 0.21
Brazil 0.25 0.44 0.11
Canada 0.25 0.89 0.22
Chile 0.25 0.77 0.19
China,P.R.:Hong Kong 1.00 0.83 0.83
Colombia 0.00 0.30 0.00
Costa Rica 0.25 0.64 0.16
Denmark 0.75 0.92 0.69
Dominican Republic 0.25 0.59 0.15
Ecuador 0.25 0.32 0.08
Egypt 1.00 0.53 0.53
El Salvador 0.50 0.34 0.17
Finland 0.25 0.93 0.23
France 0.00 0.77 0.00
Germany 0.75 0.87 0.65
Greece 0.25 0.62 0.16
Guatemala 0.25 0.22 0.06
Haiti 0.50 0.13 0.06
India 1.00 0.54 0.54
Indonesia 1.00 0.27 0.27
Ireland 0.25 0.85 0.21
Israel 1.00 0.74 0.74
Italy 0.50 0.72 0.36
Jamaica 0.25 0.32 0.08
Japan 0.50 0.86 0.43
Kenya 1.00 0.19 0.19
Korea 1.00 0.41 0.41
Malaysia 1.00 0.71 0.71
Mexico 0.00 0.38 0.00
Netherlands 0.50 0.90 0.45
New Zealand 0.75 0.96 0.72
Nicaragua 0.50 0.32 0.16
Nigeria 1.00 0.23 0.23
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Norway 0.50 0.96 0.48
Pakistan 1.00 0.31 0.31
Panama 0.75 0.40 0.30
Paraguay 0.25 0.33 0.08
Peru 0.00 0.37 0.00
Philippines 0.00 0.48 0.00
Portugal 0.25 0.77 0.19
Singapore 0.75 0.98 0.74
South Africa 0.75 0.74 0.55
Spain 0.50 0.76 0.38
Sri Lanka 0.75 0.41 0.31
Sweden 0.50 0.91 0.45
Switzerland 0.25 1.00 0.25
Taiwan 0.50 0.73 0.37
Thailand 0.75 0.60 0.45
Trinidad and Tobago 0.75 0.63 0.47
Turkey 0.50 0.50 0.25
United Kingdom 1.00 0.92 0.92
United States 0.25 0.81 0.20
Uruguay 0.25 0.57 0.14
Venezuela 0.50 0.33 0.17
Zimbabwe 1.00 0.46 0.46
Source: LLSV(1998), Country Codes and Regulations, Kaufmann et al. (1999),
 authors’ calculations
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Appendix 2
Table B1
Estimation Method: Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: DLn(Real Private Credit)
Explanatory Variables I II
Foreign Shock 9.17 *** 9.80 **
3.13 3.86
Foregin Shock*Cred_Index -7.02 * -8.55 **
3.86 4.27
DLn(Inf) -0.10 *
0.06
Gov Surplus/GDP 9.05E-03 **
3.72E-03
Constant 0.02 0.04 **
0.01 0.02
R2 0.05 0.13
F test (Whole Regression) 9.55 9.61
Prob > F 0.00 0.00
Obs 568 421
*** Significant at 1%
**  Significant at 5%
*   Significant at 10%
